Zombie bridge awaits decapitation

Remember the Garden Bridge, the weed-capped insult to honest procurement, the unlamented jolly folly in the middle of London's River Thames, a celebrity-garlanded monument to starry-eyed foolishness?

You may recall that London's mayor, Sadiq Khan, struck the project a mortal blow when he withdrew his support for the scheme on 28th April. Khan was responding to Margaret Hodge's project review, which had already assaulted the victim with a series of timely and well-deserved knife wounds.

So why is the Garden Bridge still in the news now? It seems the body was not properly buried, but has emerged from the grave and is shambling onwards, a terrifying vision of a zombie bridge. What animates this supposedly lifeless corpse?

The power of celebrity clearly remains strong, and retains its power to utterly and completely cloud critical thinking. Architect Richard Rogers recently offered the project extensive praise in the Evening Standard, the official journal of the Garden Bridge Fan Club.

The speciousness of Rogers' arguments is apparent from the outset. He opens his article by observing: "The River Thames should be London's greatest asset but for centuries it was a barrier rather than a connection", and commenting on how the better parts of the Thames river banks are those that act as public promenades. It is these very same promenades that the Garden Bridge would obliterate at its chosen location, and the over-tall bridge would have been as much a barrier as a connection, destroying fine views along the river. The celebrity friends and hangers-on can sprinkle the zombie bridge with perfume, but it will not obscure the rotten stench of the undead.

Petitioners against the project have discovered that Khan did more than withdraw financial guarantees for future bridge maintenance, he revoked a series of previous mayoral decisions which had been issued in its favour. This removes not only financial support, but policy support, essentially preventing the London Assembly or Transport for London continuing to support the private Garden Bridge Trust in pursuing the scheme.

Given this, what is surprising is that the other public bodies involved in the project, such as London Borough of Lambeth, have remained silent, and not also made public an intention to no longer engage with the Garden Bridge Trust. It's remarkable that the Trust itself, which was barely a going concern several months ago, has not made public any plans to wind itself up, settling its debts (such as to the disappointed main contractor) and returning whatever funds it is able to.

And it's amazing that there is still complete silence from all involved on who is to blame for the whole fiasco (especially the shady design procurement processes), and what consequences will fall upon them.

Previous posts: Garden Bridge saga

Folly's end

So ... it was the Pontist wot won it*. Just a mere 5 days after I extensively documented the Garden Bridge's multitude of failings, London's Mayor Sadiq Khan has pulled the plug on his financial support for the scheme, almost certainly killing the project.

I will not be providing Mayoral guarantees for the Garden Bridge Project - my letter to the Chair of the Garden Bridge Trust. pic.twitter.com/xg6jzhZ0Zs

— Mayor of London (@MayorofLondon) April 28, 2017

It's great that someone finally grew some balls and did what was necessary, but it's a scandal that it took so long and that £46m of public money had to be wasted first.

The Garden Bridge Trust has said little in response, but without government support, I anticipate that further private funders will withdraw their commitments, and the Trust will rapidly have to declare a halt to its activities in order to be able to meet its existing obligations to creditors. Without the mayor's financial guarantees, the Trust cannot start work on site as it cannot discharge a key planning condition.

Opinion on Twitter seems split about 90% against the bridge, and 10% in favour, with most celebrating the demise of this ignominious project (I guess not all my readers will have spotted that the Pontist is on Twitter now as well).

The death blow to the project came with Margaret Hodge's damning report released three weeks ago, but much of what Hodge said was only possible because of the investigations by Will Hurst at the Architects' Journal, who deserves some kind of award for his persistence in uncovering many of the saga's most sordid details.

There was an interview with Hurst on LBC Radio today, and students of this story should definitely listen to the interview and read the LBC's thorough report, both of which give a very clear idea of quite why the whole Garden Bridge stinks so highly.

The bridge's "demented enemies" (to use Boris Johnson's typically colourful phrase) will now turn their attention to seeing whether those responsible for this colossal failure can be punished or at least humiliated. Some are calling for public funds to be repaid, but there is no chance whatsoever of that happening.

So far as I can see, the project's key protagonists (Johnson, Lumley, Heatherwick) have yet to say their piece, but I don't think they will do anything other than blame the malice of the bridge's opponents for its failure. It will be interesting to watch the accusations and counter-accusations over the next few weeks, but I'll be surprised if anything more comes of it than that.

One folly may be at an end, but the folly that led to it will continue to resurface on projects of this ilk, those that are only kept afloat by delusions of grandeur and by their ability to skirt proper scrutiny.

*(for non-UK readers, see here, and I'm only joking).

Has the irresistible force finally met the immovable object?

As the Garden Bridge saga appears to be drawing to an ignominious conclusion, it's a good time to ask how much this sorry tale owes to simple incompetence and how much to a more flagrant disregard of consequence.

It's a good time because Margaret Hodge’s recent report into the project lays bare many of its failings.

Hodge's report is incisive and damning. The Garden Bridge Trust's response to it is feeble-minded and exemplifies the wilful deafness to criticism which has marched the entire project into a mire of failure.

Hodge has, probably sensibly, avoided any consideration of whether the world's most expensive flowerpots would be a "good thing", although there is much to criticise here.

In principle, the idea of a garden above the Thames has some merit, but it must be offset against its adverse impacts. Published views of the bridge usually adopt a pigeon's perspective, disguising the extent to which this massive structure would blot out views across and along the river. I also think that we should all have had enough of privatised public spaces subsidised with public money, and like other heavily-surveilled areas of "public" realm, it is difficult to see the case for taxpayers funding a new garden so hemmed about with constraints on use as this one is.

If it doesn't properly consider value, the Hodge report does at least consider value for money. When the project's designers were appointed in mid-2013, the bridge was estimated to cost £60m, more than double the cost of any previous or projected footbridge elsewhere on the Thames in London. At this stage, the fee for the lead designers was anticipate to be £4m (roughly 7% of capital cost, already a very high figure for a team who would not actually deliver the detailed design).

Just one year later in June 2014, the total cost had mushroomed to some £159m. By July 2015, the sum had hit £175m, then £185m in August 2016. The Garden Bridge Trust has more recently confirmed the likely final figure to "substantially exceed" that figure, with a sum "north of £200m" reported to Margaret Hodge during the preparation of her report. And yet, the project has rolled steadily onwards, with some £46m now spent or committed without a spade so much as hovering over the ground (indeed, the detailed design of the bridge is not yet complete). This is a steam-roller set in motion but seemingly without anyone sitting in the driving seat.

Cost escalation can arise for many reasons, but chief amongst them on projects of this sort is simply that initial estimates were wrong. Scope and risks are not understood properly at an early stage, project promoters are biased towards optimism, and we are all reliant on a QS industry which isn't fit-for-purpose. There are few meaningful benchmarks for iconic projects so it's not a disgrace that the initial estimate was wrong. It is, however, a disgrace that the project was not stopped when its true costs began to emerge, and it remains a disgrace that nobody involved has the balls to stop it now as costs continue to rise.

At the same time as costs have risen, funding available has actually decreased. Although the government funding bodies have meekly handed over yet more cash every time their funding ceiling has been breached, the private funders on whom the project ultimately relies have been backing off. In spring 2015, donors had pledged £85m towards the scheme; by August 2016, the total pledge had dropped to £69m and has not increased since.

We are witnessing the collision of an irresistible force with an immovable object. The force originates in the vanity and ego of the project's promoters, principally the much-lampooned Boris Johnson. This was facilitated by a cultural failing, an uncritical adulation of celebrities (in this case, Joanna Lumley and Thomas Heatherwick) which diminishes what few critical faculties our public bodies can bring to bear at the best of times. Once the beast has been set in motion, it is simply "face" that continues to propel it forwards, the false hope that eventual project success will vindicate the troubled journey. We've also seen, writ horribly large, the sunk cost fallacy, with several of the project's fans noting that so much money has been spent, it would simply be wasted if the project were now to cease.

It seems overwhelmingly likely that it will now be wasted: £46m of public money pissed into the Thames without any of those responsible having to suffer the just consequences of their monumental failure.

The seemingly irresistible force is hitting its immovable object: the money simply isn't there. The government and current mayor have hedged their bets even as the costs continue to mount, readying their excuses for abandoning this sinking ship.

Sometimes when costs escalate, they can be tolerated on the grounds of the project's final value, an economist's totting up of the public benefit. That has been attempted here, with a business case thrown together in May 2014 after the project was already well underway, with design team appointed, costs rising, and up to £60m of public funding already announced. Hodge rubbishes the business case, which had already been found to be questionable and weak by central government.

One of the most damning aspects of Hodge's report is her criticism of the appointment of the project design team. I think this is symptomatic of a much wider failure of accountability and effective project control, exemplified by the lack of a properly motivated driver at the controls of the steam-roller, anyone who would feel it in their own pocket when things went wrong.

Hodge records that in March 2013 Heatherwick Studio was appointed to design the bridge, having won a quickly concocted procurement exercise against Marks Barfield and Wilkinson Eyre. This particular farrago has been dissected elsewhere, so I'll just summarise the key points. The three competitors were invited to bid for a "feasibility study", despite the fact that Heatherwick had been discussing the project with the London Mayor since July 2012, and seems to have already had a giant flower-point design stuffed down a back-pocket.

Hodge's report documents in detail what a farce this procurement exercise was, with several iterations of a briefing document showing how Heatherwick's key role was openly acknowledged then gradually cut out to ensure that a "neutral" procurement document could be presented to others.

I'll take the position that the evaluation of the tenders was utterly incompetent, but frankly it stinks of worse, and clients are normally careful to avoid such an impression. Heatherwick Studio scored above the other contenders both on "relevant design experience" and "understanding of the brief". On the first point it seems inarguable that Heatherwick actually demonstrated the weakest relevant experience to conducting a footbridge feasibility study. The commercial evaluation was even more of a joke, with Heatherwick's proposed fee of £173,000 dwarfing the other two proposals (£49,939 and £15,125). The client team sought clarification from Heatherwick, who then significantly reduced their fee, allowing them to win the work.

Heatherwick have been paid over £2.6m for their work on the project, which may sound like a lot of money, but will sound like a lot more if it turns out to be for something that is never built.

The appointment of the project's engineer and project manager seems to have been little better. Thirteen consultancies bid for this role, with Arup winning in July 2013. Arup had already been working with Heatherwick Studio, but they were placed only 7th in the initial tender evaluation due to the level of their fee. Despite this, they were included among 5 bidders shortlisted for further consideration. Of those, Arup were the only bidder contacted specifically and asked to revise their charges, which they did before then being appointed.

Elsewhere in Hodge's report, she notes that the key official most most directly responsible for both procurement decisions had come from Arup to Transport for London, and subsequently returned to Arup in 2016.

As of April 2015, Arup had been paid £8.4m for their work, and I would not be surprised if the total has now reached eight figures. There must have been some interesting discussions about "change control" given that the original funding authorised to commence design (for both architect and engineer combined) was only £4m. The £8.4m fee is only about 4% of the latest forecast capital cost, which might seem reasonable given that the detailed design is being done by others (as part of the design-and-build contract), but it's still a struggle to imagine quite what all that money was spent on.

There is much more of interest in Margaret Hodge’s report, and I recommend it to anyone interested in how grand and foolish projects of this type are procured. It should certainly be required reading for anyone with direct responsibility for procurement or project management of schemes which are iconic, vanity-driven or otherwise dubious in real merit.

If the current Mayor of London decides to proceed further with the Garden Bridge, then he is clearly a fool, and he will join the long list of those associated with the scheme who will have stood watch while costs continue to escalate. If as, seems more likely, he decides it is time to throw in the towel and cease providing financial support, an almighty mess can be expected to ensue.

Without financial support from Transport for London, the Garden Bridge Trust, which is already barely a going concern, cannot continue. TfL and the Department for Transport have already under-written the Trust’s cancellation liabilities, but these are capped and I suspect will not be resolved cleanly. There has been a contractor appointed since March 2016 (Bouygues), who in turn have a designer and who are presumably not carrying any of the risk of project cancellation. They will wish to be paid in full for all their costs incurred.

Much of TfL's funding for the project is in the form of a loan to the Garden Bridge Trust, which would be written off. All this would form part of the estimated £46m of taxpayers' funding which will never be recovered.

The blame game that will commence will then form the real interest. Teflon-shouldered Boris, and the ever-defensive coterie of Garden Bridge zealots, will blame the project's failure on the naysayers and the (sadly accurate) prophets of doom, and will never accept or acknowledge their own role in this all-too-avoidable fiasco. The many individuals whose incompetence and cowardice enabled it all to happen are likely to get off scot-free.

If history can tell us anything, it is that flagrant malfeasance shall have no consequences, and that lessons will be stated clearly but not learned. I'm reminded, inevitably, of Sunderland’s River Wear Crossing fiasco, with its overly-ambitious iconic design, the deafness of all involved to external criticism, and the millions of pounds pointlessly wasted. Those responsible in that case also suffered no consequence.

Readers may also fondly recall Glasgow's Broomielaw to Tradeston footbridge, where the promoter again ploughed on despite expert criticism, before eventually being forced to abandon increasingly expensive plans. I discussed the invulnerability of the Garden Bridge's ambitious yet deluded proponents to reasonable criticism in a previous post.

The culture of impunity enjoyed by the celebrity-addled nincompoops who are appointed to, supposedly, spend our money wisely, seems unlikely to change any time soon. They will not even feel the shame that they so clearly ought to, the loss of face is too much to contemplate.

I would hope, however, that the various professions and professionals involved in this and other similarly sorry stories might pause to consider the ethics of our own positions.

Can we simply say that it is the fault of the farmer for providing us with an over-sized trough from which to guzzle? Are we right to say that decisions on what to spend and how to spend it are for the promoters and politicians, and we will simply close our eyes and hold our noses and follow their bidding? Are we also too eager to be blinded by glamour and the excitement of association?

More positively, what are we doing to assist our clients and the wider public to understand our project risks, to understand the primacy of project value, and to help them with better evidence so that they can make better decisions, ideally before the steam-roller is ever put into gear?

Previous posts
Garden Bridge proposed in London
£4m to design white elephant
Heatherwick's Garden Bridge gains planning consent from Lambeth Council
London's Garden Bridge: grumbling rumbles on, but here's a wrinkle
London's Garden Bridge: to build, or not to build?

London's Garden Bridge: to build, or not to build?

There's an excellent post about the London Garden Bridge on the Being Brunel blog, titled "Why do we hate the Garden Bridge?". I don't think the author has covered all the bases, and he seems far too well disposed to the possibility that this unspoiled spot on the Thames could reasonably be home to a private garden. However, it's well worth reading.

I've discussed the scheme here before a few times - I think its failings are primarily political rather than in the detail of its design.

I'm interested in what others think: should the Garden Bridge be built? Will it get built? Please feel free to post in the comments.

If the Garden Bridge is not built, what else could usefully be done with the money?

For a start Wandsworth Council are planning a far more practical bridge between Pimlico and Nine Elms which is not yet fully funded. Various ideas for bridges over the Thames in East London also remain overwhelmingly popular with the public.

My reader (and author of an excellent encyclopaedia) David McFetrich posted in the comments to my last post with the following suggestion:

"If there is money available for a new 'fun' bridge in London, instead of the Garden Bridge (with its problems of high cost, impact on Thames views and questionable infrastructural benefit) why not build a replica of the medieval London Bridge? Since this could be built on dry land across a site that later became an artificial lake, it would be far cheaper to build, and it would generate its own income by letting out the shop space either side of the roadway and from entrance fees paid by visitors. The lake could even be surrounded by gardens. The main problem would be to find a sufficiently large space in a readily accessible part of London. Is there room at the new park where the Olympics were held?"

Now there's a question, which chimes well with Being Brunel's view that the proposal has merits as a garden, just not with public money or necessarily at its proposed site. Again, I'd be interested in comments - what do you think would make a sensible bridge-related alternative to the Garden Bridge?

I quite like the idea of a replica Old London Bridge, although I'm pretty sure there's no space at the former Olympic Park and there's an element of kitsch to it. It could be built for far less than the Garden Bridge, and raise rather than waste money by providing lettable space.

London's Garden Bridge: grumbling rumbles on, but here's a wrinkle

With the utterly unsurprising announcement that London's Mayor, Boris Johnson, has given the go-ahead to the Garden Bridge project, it's perhaps worth taking stock.

I commented on this fiasco-in-the-making last month, noting that its progress now seemed unstoppable, short of the unlikely scenario of the bridge's designers suddenly realising their own folly in an "Oh my goodness, what have I done?" moment, and deciding to quit.

This is a bridge, let's recall, which at £175m has a price tag grossly in excess of what even Donald Trump could consider reasonable (indeed, it's perhaps a surprise that Trump isn't involved, offering copious sponsorship in return for adding a couple of par-3 golf holes to the bridge). This puts it well beyond the realm of the most expensive pedestrian bridges ever built, by a considerable multiple. Having initially promised that no public funding would ever be provided, Johnson and partner-in-crime George Osborne then each offered £30m of taxpayers cash to underwrite the job.

The rest of the funding has to come from private sponsors, and so much is required that this supposedly public oasis will be converted twelve times a year into a private garden party for the use of its wealthy benefactors. Perhaps the capital city's poor and hungry can swim beneath the bridge on such occasions in the hope that some crumbs may spill from the lavishly decorated table. For the rest of the year, the bridge will be closed at night, forbidden to cyclists, and large groups (of 8 or more people) will be obliged to sneak across hoping they can dodge the inevitable CCTV hidden behind cherry blossom. For a bridge supposed to offer a great experience for the public, it won't even be a public right of way.

The bridge will ruin views along and across the Thames, including of St Paul's Cathedral, who have joined an ever-lengthening list of people who have woken up to the bridge's adverse impacts. It's neither a very good garden (central London being already well-provided with large public parkland), nor a very useful bridge, serving no genuinely worthwhile transport need. As the Guardian has recently noted, it turns the Thames into a playground for private fantasies, not public benefit.

Even bridge engineers, never an outspoken lot, are lining up to critique the proposals. Bridge expert Simon Bourne (not a fan of extravagance) was cited in the New Civil Engineer magazine stating that a decent bridge could be built for just £50m, a snip compared to the bill for the Garden Bridge. That certainly sounds reasonable, given that the structurally challenging Millennium Bridge cost about £23m just over a decade ago, and that between £26m and £40m is anticipated for the new pedestrian bridge planned at Nine Elms (of which, more another time).

In the latest New Civil Engineer, the Garden Bridge Trust's Paul Morrell responds to Bourne's criticism. Morrell is a Big Cheese, formerly the government's Chief Construction Adviser. However, his defence of the Garden Bridge illustrates everything which is wrong with this scheme.

Morrell says: "I could ask for the breakdown of [Bourne's] estimate of £50m so we can learn from it", which would seem a complete waste of time given that we already have well-established benchmark costs for pedestrian bridges over the Thames. However, a failure to benchmark costs against comparable projects is entirely normal for those whose infatuation with grandiosity triumphs over common sense.

Morrell goes on to note that £50m wouldn't even cover the Garden Bridge's non-construction costs (fees, fund-raising, land, compensation and "a long list of issues that you really do need to be working on the project to understand"). This patronising contempt for transparency is startling, but not as startling as learning that well in excess of £50m is required before you even start building the bridge - this is really quite disgraceful, but typical of a Grand Projet culture where there is little or no meaningful challenge regarding value for money.

Of course, Morrell is a quantity surveyor, a man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. Notably, declarations of the value of the Green Bridge have been largely poetic rather than economic in nature: hello trees, hello flowers, hello sky. The government's own guidance for public investment, the Treasury's Green Book, is routinely ignored by political promoters of the extravagant, as it requires benefits, however nebulous, to be properly evaluated and judged against the investment required. With the Garden Bridge, the net benefit may in fact be negative, and it's no surprise that no assessment of the bridge's actual value has been undertaken or published. Morrell ought to know this, so his mis-direction in justifying his project's exorbitant cost is particularly depressing.

Morrell claims: "There is always something cheaper if that is your main aim in life, but it would not get consent, nor would it be fundable, and nor would it deliver what this bridge is designed to be: a unique celebration of British talent and creativity, of design and horticulture, of this great city - and of engineering".

Again, this is just rhetorical sleight-of-hand. We are not obliged to celebrate any of these, and certainly not to divert public money in order to do so at a time when increasing numbers of our population are unable to afford to feed their families properly. Given the other pedestrian bridges which have been built over the Thames or which are planned, it's perfectly clear that a bridge can be built which offers genuine value, at a lower price, which can get consent, and for which funding can readily be obtained, if only the political will permits. Morrell, dazzled by his association with celebrity, seems unable to see that every penny spent on the Garden Bridge folly diverts resources from transport links which would serve genuine need elsewhere in the city.

The sense of defensiveness and the deaf ear to criticism and challenge is deeply reminiscent of two other architecturally extravagant bridge follies from recent times. Sunderland's ill-fated River Wear Bridge was also widely criticised, and as with the Garden Bridge, its backers misrepresented public opinion and ploughed on regardless, wasting millions of pounds of public money in the process. Simon Bourne was one of the critics on that occasion, as well. Glasgow's Neptune's Way farrago was a similar example: an absurd and rightly-criticised design which could not, in the end, be afforded, and was ditched in favour of an economic design serving the same purpose without the pointless showing off.

There is some hope that the bridge may yet be put to the sword before too much money is wasted. There's a suggestion that lawyers may seek a judicial review of the planning decisions. In addition, one of the planning conditions imposed by Westminster is that Transport for London must underwrite the future maintenance costs of the bridge (several million pounds every year). Opponents of the project are hoping that this may yet scupper the plans, Mayor Boris Johnson has confirmed that TfL have no intention of underwriting the maintenance.

Heatherwick's Garden Bridge gains planning consent from Lambeth Council

Love it or loathe it, the world's most expensive pedestrian bridge has now secured half of the planning consent that it needs to go ahead. Of course, I loathe it. It's an utterly disgraceful waste of public money in a location which doesn't need another tourist attraction, nor need to be the site of a bridge which would permanently wreck the London riverscape.

As with the ill-fated River Wear Crossing in Sunderland, public opinion has been consistently misrepresented by its backers. Other than one or two people involved with the design team, I've not met a professional bridge designer who likes it. The architecture critics see it for the white elephant that it is. Even London's mayor doesn't quite see why he's spending public money on it. A highly critical and cogent campaign against it by local residents seems to have fallen on deaf ears.

What's clear about the Garden Bridge is how the cult of celebrity provides a comfort blanket allowing people to suspend their normal critical faculties. It's got Heatherwick, it must be good. Joanna Lumley likes it. It seems clear that, short of hoping for the bridge to fail to secure the necessary funding or to come in way over-budget once it reaches construction tender stage (both being quite realistic possibilities of course), the only way to put a stop to this fiasco is for the designers themselves to wake up to the realities of their iconic fantasy, do the decent thing, and quit.

£4m to design white elephant

Thomas Heatherwick's proposal for a "garden bridge" across London's Thames has been in the news again. BDOnline reports that Transport for London (TfL) will spend £4m to develop the bridge design through to planning consent stage.

I hope you were sitting down when you read that. Four. Million. Pounds. For the preliminary design of a concrete flowerpot, to be plonked in the middle of London with as little sensitivity as is imaginable.

It's the sort of sum that may well be applicable for a major bridge, but to me seems well out of proportion for a footbridge, particularly one where there is no compelling need for a crossing (it will be barely 250 metres away from the nearest existing Thames bridge, Waterloo Bridge), and there's nobody yet willing to pay for its construction. The hope is that private donors will pay for the entire project, with TfL committing nothing beyond the initial development costs, and carrying the risk that if the scheme goes nowhere, that money is simply wasted.

TfL's £4m figure comes from a committee paper available online, which reveals April 2014 as the target date for the planning application, meaning they must burn through roughly half a million pounds a month in the feasibility stage. The £4m isn't just for design development, it also covers consents fees, public consultation, and establishing a charity whose aim is to raise private funding for construction and maintenance. Nonetheless, it's a staggering expenditure, and even more eyebrow-raising when you note that this is a proposal which was never in TfL's business plan, but for which money has had to be found largely to satisfy a passing mayoral whim.

Maintenance alone is expected to cost anywhere from £3m to £5m, on top of an initial construction cost of from £60m to £100m. That would make this, I am pretty sure, the most expensive pedestrian bridge every built, by some way, three, four or even five times as expensive as London's Millennium Bridge, and trumping even the costly Gateshead Millennium Bridge on a pound per metre basis (flowerpot: up to £400k per metre; blinking eye: about £190k per metre, allowing for inflation).

These are only initial figures, with more accurate estimates anticipated at the end of September.

I find the entire idea beggars belief. This is a bridge with no real purpose (the additional green space created is peanuts relative to Green Park, 20 minutes walk away); which nobody (yet) is willing to pay for (other than the £4m of public funds to be washed down the drain); for which the likely cost must outweigh the likely
value on any conceivable scale; which would almost certainly become a public liability at some point in the future; and which judging from the images created so far looks like a massive blot on the landscape (probably more so when the scale and impact of the approaches at either end become apparent). If this doesn't meet the definition of a white elephant, what does?

Even in a time of austerity, there should be room for a little frivolity, a larger amount of fun, and for things that offset gloom with positive vision. However, if private donors really do have £60m or £100m to spare right now, it's hard not to think of more useful ways of spending their money.

Updated 30th July: Gateshead bridge costs amended (see comments).

Garden bridge proposed in London

Images have been released for a proposed "garden bridge" to span London's River Thames, to be designed by Thomas Heatherwick with Arup. The bridge would cross the Thames near Temple and the South Bank, roughly half way between Waterloo and Blackfriars road bridges. The proposal is supported by London's Mayor, Boris Johnson, as well as by actor Joanna Lumley.

My understanding is that the scheme originated in an unsolicited proposal from Heatherwick Studio to Transport for London, who subsequently appointed an engineering partner via competitive tender to help understand and develop the feasibility of the proposal.

The bridge would form the third of a triumvirate of lavishly expensive central London pedestrian bridges, lying halfway between Hungerford Bridge (£40m) to the west, and the Millennium Bridge (£23m) to the east. The bridge trumps both structures with a reported cost of up to £60m, although it appears neither Transport for London nor the Mayor actually wish to spend any of their own money on it. It shares this pie-in-the-sky nature with the £22m Diamond Jubilee Bridge, a proposal much further west, which recently received planning consent in spite of a complete absence of any funding.

If it goes ahead, the Heatherwick bridge would surely become the most expensive pedestrian bridge ever built, by some margin.

The hope is that a sugar-daddy sponsor may step in and pay for this gigantic concrete flowerpot, as was the case with the ArcelorMittal Orbit, an extravagant folly almost entirely paid for by steel tycoon Lakshmi Mittal, and to some extent the Emirates Air Line cable car, which received the lion's share of its funding from the titular airline. Indeed, the comparison with the Orbit seems particularly apt, as being a spectacular tourist attraction where an artist's peculiar vision has been writ at such gigantic scale as to overpower almost everything around it. I would wonder whether the same sorry aesthetic compromises and pungent brashness that mar the Orbit would find their way into the Heatherwick structure.

There is an element of structural logic to the Heatherwick proposal - it gives the appearance of a prestressed concrete balanced cantilever bridge an entirely reasonable solution for the site and function. Maintenance costs should be low, and the structure can be built with relatively low disruption to river traffic. It will be robust in the event of vessel impact, and invulnerable to wobble.

Heatherwick has some history in bridge design, with Paddington's Rolling Bridge, and an unbuilt proposal for a glass bridge at London's Kings Cross. As with pretty much all of his other work, these combine considerable levels of ingenuity with an open-minded, sparklingly creative approach to design geometry. Heatherwick's training was not that of an architect, but in"three dimensional design", at Manchester Polytechnic and the Royal College of Arts, and this seems to limit his scope when he works with architecture.

Both the bridges mentioned are very clever, very well crafted objects, and looking at these images, I have a sense that this bridge is imagined as an object, or at most a place, but not as part of a wider landscape. Like his other bridges, there is no sense that it responds in any way to its context - it could be plonked down in many other cities without any sense that Heatherwick would design it differently.

The highly articulated fluting of the bridge piers and soffit seems an attempt to break up what would otherwise be large areas of unattractive concrete, but will need constant illumination to retain any visual interest on an overcast, rainy day.

The ends of the bridge must (as with any of the central London bridges) land at a level well above the river bank, to maintain navigational clearances, but the proposed form, handsome in its isolation from what it connects, offers no clues as to how pedestrians will access it from the bankside below. At both ends, there are no pre-existing higher level features in the vicinity, and I wonder what ponderous impact it would have, especially on the south end which is currently occupied by a mix of low-height buildings and open space, one of the few welcome respites from London's overcrowded south river bank.

In short, I'm simply not sure that Heatherwick has the sensitivity to context to allow his vision to dominate such a significant location. He is the British jack-of-all-trades designer with the highest public profile, and it strikes me as a huge shame that nobody else is being offered the opportunity to come up with proposals for the site. The local authority's desire to use name-recognition to draw in sponsorship and obtain public infrastructure at minimal cost is understandable, but shouldn't be an excuse to adopt anything other than the best design solution.